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A Systematic Review of Contract Farming, and its Impact on Broiler Producers in Lebanon 
 
Abstract 
This Thesis has been realized within the agribusiness sector and experiments the Transaction Cost              
Theory a branch of the New Institutional Economy which explain market failure caused by many               
factors. Transaction costs are associated with carrying a transaction between buyers and sellers. This              
study has been conducted between 2014 and 2017; and has collected data from 11 broiler producers in                 
Jezzine, Lebanon, about: Production costs, capital investment, revenues, land tenure, access to            
infrastructure, and information about the contract. The propensity score matching method is used to              
compare the effect of participating in contract farming and to solve the hypotheses, which say: There is                 
a positive relationship between contract farming and the economic benefits of broiler producers and the               
development of the broiler sector in Jezzine District. Findings from farmer’s interviews indicated that              
sustainability, guaranteed price, risk reduction, credit facilities and technical aids are the main reasons              
for signing a contract. In contrast, Farmers have expressed problems concerning the contractors’             
responsibilities such as delay in payment and delivery. Also, when prices are high, it was argued that                 
farmers were selling the products in the open market. 
 
Keywords:​ Contract farming, broiler producers, economic sustainability. 
 
Introduction 
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 In the Global Value Chain, agriculture must be able to meet the rapidly growing demand for food, and                  
a global strategy is needed to ensure a sustainable food production system, to face the challenge of                 
feeding 9 billion people in 2050, and to ensure that every human being has access to adequate food                  
(Godfray, Beddington, Crute, haddad, Lawrence, Muir & Toulmin, 2010). Agricultural value chains are             
undergoing rapid transformation changes because of urbanization, industrialization, globalization, and          
trade liberalization (Reardon & Barrett, 2000; Reardon & Timmer, 2007; Swinnen, 2007; Reardon,             
Barrett, Berdegue & Swinnen, 2009); also because of capital mobility, income growth, technology,             
innovation, product differentiation, changes in consumer preferences, diet westernization, shifting          
consumption toward processed foods, and improved communications which are linking small farmers            
with consumers worldwide (Pingali, 2007); besides the spreading of supermarkets and fast-food            
restaurants, and the growing importance of quality standards (Reardon & Berdegue, 2002;            
Weatherspoon & Reardon, 2003; Shepherd, 2005). Supermarkets procurement system favors          
centralized purchasing, specialized wholesalers, and certified suppliers (Neven & Reardon, 2004;           
Berdegue, Balsevish, Flores & Reardon, 2005); these characteristics require more vertical integration,            
thus favoring the introduction of contract farming (Key & Runsten, 1999; Bijman, 2008). Spurred by               
those changes, agricultural systems are being forced to adapt and modernize, they have been              
restructured, becoming increasingly market-oriented and consumer-driven, also new ways of          
organizing the agri-food sector are being promoted; and different forms of vertical integration are being               
introduced (Elms & Low, 2013). In these modern systems, the traditional spot market mechanism in               
which food is produced, without farmers having a clear idea in advance; to whom, when and at what                  
price they are going to sell their crops, is being replaced by alternative forms of vertical integration,                 
strategic alliances, or full ownership, also it has provided the drive for further development and a rapid                 
expansion of contract farming, which has been studied extensively for decades, and has become an               
essential element of modern agricultural value chains (Shepherd, 2007). 
 
Literature Review 
Current literature for contract studies mainly focuses on incentives and risk shares. Some authors of               
case studies of broiler contracts between farmers and processors have argued that risk reduction is a                
major incentive for contracting and contract-farming reduces transaction costs and can make            
smallholders overcome existing market imperfections; Contract farming is an institutional solution to            
the problems of market failure (Grosh, 1994; Key and Runsten, 1999). It is generally considered that                
contract farming ensures consistent procurement and therefore helps processing companies to optimize            
their processing capacity and their fixed assets investment with regard to spot markets; discontinuity              
risks while avoiding integrated production risks (Eaton et Shepherd, 2001; Johnson and Foster, 1994;              
Knoeber and Thurman, 1995). Contracting is common for industrial crops (e.g. sugarcane, tobacco, tea,              
broiler, dairy, and horticulture) particularly when destined for high-income consumers willing to pay a              
premium for quality and food safety (Minot 1986). The origin of the contracting is so different.                
Development of agriculture from a traditional structure to a market oriented structure is the major               
challenge for developing, less developed countries and economies in transition. For these countries, it              
is generally agreed that food processing is a key industry which should receive high priority both at                 
national and international levels. The food-processing industry is important for economic growth and             
health of people. Development of food industry promotes development in other sectors through forward              
and backward linkages. Developing countries need to develop their food resources more extensively             
not only to provide new job opportunities and increase national income via accruing value and exports,                
but also to supply safe and adequate processed food to consumers. In a globalized world, there is a                  
close relationship between the changes in agricultural and food markets of developed countries and              
developments in developing and less developed countries through international funds and donors,            
foreign direct investments and activities of multinational companies. The wave of privatization and             
liberalization of the developed world have helped in bringing about a new form of vertical coordination                
between private companies and farmers in countries which are so called countries in transition. Recent               
developments in peri-urban areas of West Africa such as structural reforms, encouragement of             
subsistence farming to grow high-value crops, enhancing private sector have created remarkable            
changes in production and marketing organization using in many cases contract farming. It has been               
observed that there is an increased importance in close vertical coordination in the countries in               
transition. 
 
Theoretical Foundations 
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 The starting point for this perspective is Coase’s in 1937 with a simple question: why do firms exist?                  
(Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985) Coase’s answer is: to minimize the transaction costs of exchange              
(Coase & Piaget, 1661; Schlag, 1989; Coase, 2012). Thus, if it is cheaper for a firm to produce an                   
input, compared to purchasing it, in an uncertain and unreliable market, then it will integrate backwards                
to do so (Stuckey & White, 1993). 
 
All markets require some form of vertical coordination between participants, such as farmers,             
processors, wholesalers, and retailers (Minot, 2011). Often transaction without any contract is called:             
spot market or open market that involves no written or oral commitments, it provides freedom but                
uncertainties for buyers and sellers (Rehber, 1998, 2000). In general spot markets show deficiencies; in               
overcoming problems resulting from imperfect markets, and in transferring information regarding           
quality, timing and future demand. One way of vertical integration in agriculture is contract farming; it                
is an intermediate form of industrial organization standing between spot markets and full vertical              
integration (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002). It is evolved in order to overcome constraints of market               
failures, and missing markets: observed in terms of natural vagaries and price fluctuations, to ensure               
market participation of smallholder and marginal farmers (Barrett, 2008). 
 
Foundation in Transaction Cost Theory 
The major theoretical background for contract farming is based on the Transaction Cost Theory, which               
is a branch of New Institutional Economics, which provides a useful explanation of many problems of                
market failure and missing markets caused by asymmetric information and a range of other factors               
(Kherallah & Kirsten, 2002). 
 
According to the New Institutional Economics, all market transactions between economic actors are             
hazardous, involve costs, and can entail considerable losses; institutions have been created to reduce              
the costs of resource allocation and uncertainty level (Williamson, 1979). Transaction costs are defined              
as the costs associated with carrying out a transaction between buyers and sellers, including: finding a                
buyer, reaching, negotiating, delivering the commodity, obtaining payment, enforcing agreements as           
well as the risks associated with the transaction (Coase, 1960; Allen, 1999; MacDonald, Perry, Ahearn,               
Banker, Chambers, Dimitri & Southard, 2004; Minot, 2011). Because contracting involves costs, it is              
economically justifiable only: when the buyer is a large firm; when the product is characterized by                
large quality variations, perishability, technically difficult production, and high value product; when the             
policy environment is conducive, and the destination market is willing to pay a premium for certain                
product attributes (Minot, 2007, 2011). Transaction costs in agriculture sector are high in many              
developing countries; they contribute to market failures and imperfect markets (Pingali, Khwaja &             
Meijer, 2005). Different governance structures and contracting forms arise and the most suitable             
depends on the costs and the characteristics of a transaction (Williamson, 1981). 
 
Factors for the emergence of contract farming 
We consider many factors for the emergence and evolution of contract farming: bounded rationality,              
opportunistic behavior, asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency of transactions; in the absence of             
these factors, spot market trading is most efficient, and contract farming would not occur since               
agribusiness firms could buy all their produce from the spot market which would be instantly and                
perfectly responsive to their demand (Williamson, 1979; Simmons, 2002). However, in reality one or              
more of these problems may happen which indicates the need for contract farming. Another              
procurement option for agribusiness firms is to operate their own plantations; yet, with this option they                
may face other transaction costs such as supervision costs, costs of land and skill acquisition, and crop                 
risk. Therefore, contract farming may occur only if it generates lower transaction costs compared to the                
other alternatives of market arrangement (Hobbs, 1996; Eaton & Shepherd, 2001; Simmons, 2002).             
Among the many aspects in current analyses are organizational arrangements like: 
 
Bounded Rationality: Contracted parties suffer from information deficiencies and are unable to process             
all the information available to them to formulate solution and solve complex problems in a costless                
and straightforward way (Simmons, Winters & Patrick, 2005; Bijman, 2008); 
 
Opportunistic Behavior: The probability that the other party will engage in opportunistic behavior is              
hard and costly to predict. Actors seek self-interest without considering the other party; they can               
deceive, lie, cheat and steal (Bijman, 2008); 
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Asset Specificity: An investment made by farmer or buyer which is dedicated to a certain transaction                
has little or no value in alternative use which leads to asset specificity and may result in hold-up                  
problems. Thus, commodities with a higher degree of asset specificity require an involvement in              
vertical coordination in order to reduce risks, and to protect those assets (Gow & Swinnen, 1998;                
Martinez, 1999; Bijman, 2008); 
 
Level of Uncertainty: Lack of information about market conditions for farmers, and about the quality of                
product for buyers is a challenge in carrying out profitable transactions. The main source of uncertainty                
is incomplete and asymmetric information on current and future conditions (Bijman, 2008; Prowse,             
2012); 
 
Frequency of Transactions: A repeated interaction between trading partners to maintain a reputation             
for fair dealing and to mitigate opportunism, even in the absence of contracts or vertical integration                
(Klein, 2006). 
 
Hypotheses Development 
It is clear that there are some controversies and gaps in the existing literature about the impacts of                  
contract farming on broiler producers, certain areas have been widely addressed by researchers, while              
other areas such as long-term profitability have been less explored. The contract system has advantages               
and disadvantages, one of the key advantages for producers, is the shift of production and market risk                 
to the integrator. Similarly, contracts that broiler companies have with family farmers have allowed              
thousands of people to get into farming, diversify and expand their farming operation, and more               
securely lock in a stable income flow. Thus the hypothesis we have formulated likely mirrors the                
situation. 
- There is a positive relationship between contract farming and the economic benefits of broiler              
producers and their sustainability. 
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Figure 5: Contract Farming Conceptual Framework 
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Figure 6: Contract Farming Theoretical Framework 
 
Methodology 
Agricultural contracting has been identified as urgently needing further research, in order to explore the               
topic in depth; we compiled a literature review of existing contract farming studies, the methodology               
that we will use is by observing outcomes across different farmers implementing contract farming in a                
given time period in different areas. This kind of methodology reflects the majority of the existing                
literature around contract farming. It is a questionnaire data; the data will allow us to better understand                 
the variations in the industry. In our study, we will complete a comparative analysis between contract                
and non-contract broiler producers in Jezzine District, Lebanon. We will collect data from a sample of                
eleven broiler producers from different village based on a questionnaire, the sample of those farmers               
we choose is based on those 11 respondent criteria: 
- Geographical location which is Jezzine District. 
- The education level varies between one farmer and the other from school to university degree. 
- The age of the farmers range from 30 to 65. 
An underlying goal of our study is to explore the acknowledged gaps in the existing literature related to                  
Lebanon and in particular for Jezzine District, and to better understand the full scope of impacts of                 
contract farming on broiler producers. 
 
This dissertation contains the results of a Two-year research. We used a convenience sampling method,               
quantitative approach using an experimentation by selection of 11 farmers on a convenient sampling              
method because of limited number of farmers in Jezzine area and because they are dispersed in this                 
geographical location and it is hard to reach them all. A sample of 11 broiler producers was randomly                  
chosen. The aim is to obtain information on production, costs and production efficiency. We did a                
direct interview using a survey at the farmer level were conducted to understand and to investigate. The                 
entire research was conducted during the period between Sep 2014 and September 2017. Previous              
research indicated a wide diversity of results, from cases in which farmers have benefited substantially               
in terms of income and improved farming skills to those in which growers appear to have been severely                  
exploited by firms. The data collected from the questionnaires includes: Growing patterns, capital             
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 equipment, basic producer’s data, income and changes, changes in growing patterns and labor used,              
and differences between contract and non-contract farmers. Qualitative and quantitative assessment of            
the welfare effects of contract farming relied on the analysis of the data collected. To assess the impact                  
of contract farming participation on income, the propensity score matching method was applied. It is a                
treatment effect correction model used to reduce bias when estimating the effect of treatments. As a                
non-experimental approach, propensity score matching has been applied in many previous researches            
about contract farming; because it formulates comparison of treatment groups. In the studies of contract               
farming there are two other commonly used correction models for cross-sectional data: Instrument             
Variable Method and Heckman Selection Correction Model. The disadvantages of applying these            
models to this study are, that first there is no suitable variable associated with contract participation that                 
is independent of income estimation for instrument variable approach; second, the Heckman’s            
correction model assumes strict condition of distribution function of joint error term associated with              
participation and income equation, which does not fit with our data. Propensity score matching does               
not require any functional form assumption for matching and thus can obtain more robust estimation               
than imposing regression model with the risk of inaccurate distributional assumption. Because of these              
assumptions of our data, propensity score matching was more applicable than any other approach for               
estimating the impact of contract participation on income. Matching estimation is a widely used              
method to compare the treatment effect of participating in some programs. Basically, it compares the               
outcome of the program participants with the outcome of nonparticipants. We first assume that there               
are two potential outcomes: The outcome of the person participating in the program and the outcome of                 
the person not participating in the program. A person can only either participate or not participate the                 
program, and therefore there will be only one outcome observed. 
 
Results 
To analyze the impact of contract farming on the income of broiler producers, primary data was                
collected using questionnaires in Jezzine District. Farmers were placed into various number of both              
contract and non-contract broiler producers. The survey was conducted on May 2017. However, the              
data on production was for all the period of farmer’s production. Information collected included              
welfare characteristics of producers, land, asset endowments, access to infrastructure (roads, electricity,            
water, and telephone), information on revenue earned, cost incurred in broiler production, transaction             
costs, information about producer’s income and information about the nature of the contract. 
 
Name Location Years of 
Experience 
Number of 
Broilers 
Land Area 
M2 
Contract 
Farming 
Joe Kozhaya Wadi laymoun 3 12000 50000 Yes 
Elias Al  
Asmar 
Jezzine 7 15000 10000 No 
Tony Jadoun Zhalta 3 2500 8000 No 
Chdid Chdid Snaya 7 6000 6000 No 
Simone 
Chdid 
Snaya 7 11000 8000 No 
Salim Nassif Haytoura 5 6000 1000 No 
Pierre Antar Zhalta 1 10000 2000 No 
Maroun Bou  
Rached 
Jezzine 1 7000 30000 Yes 
Joseph Abou  
Zeid 
Sfaray 4 30000 3500 No 
Douale Zaelit Baba Azour 17 18000 20000 No 
Charbel 
Hneine 
Wadi Jezzine  6 10000 2000 No 
Table 1: Data about the surveyed broiler producers in Jezzine district 
 
In the study region, interviews have been carried out with 3 contracted and 8 farmers who do not have                   
contractual relations. Contract farming was widely used in the production of broiler. Two third of the                
farmers, who were interviewed, indicated that sustainability, guaranteed price, risk reduction, credit            
facilities and technical aids are the main reasons for signing a contract. Producers generally interpret               
they are not interested in what is written on the contract. However, half of the producers who replied to                   
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 questions about contract provisions said they did not read the contract beforehand and merely signed it.                
Producers who read the contract indicated they could not understand most of the language used.               
Farmers have expressed some problems concerning the contractors’ responsibilities such as delay in             
payment, delivery, inadequate technical input aids, and information, and that processors would like to              
spread delivery over a long period. In the study region, 8 farmers, who are not involved in a contractual                   
relationship, were interviewed. Two third of interviewed farmers indicated they were familiar with             
contract farming and had contracts previously. Farmers will not enter into contract farming unless they               
believe there will be benefits. The contracts resulted in improved returns to capital. From the average                
returns of contract and non-contract farmers the contract enables farmers to generate a positive effect               
on income for farmers. The main reason for the difference is because of contract growers had lower                 
production and transaction costs. For contact producers, the processor advances most of the inputs.              
Compared to the non contract producers, the contract grower needs less working capital and therefore               
incurs lower costs. 
 
Table 2: Result indicated by farmers and score matched on propensity method 
  Broiler producers   
Hypothesis 
Contracted 
Producers Non-Contracted Producers Variables 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
  
    
H1a: Income of   
farmers 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
  
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 Technical Support 
    
  
H1b: Poultry  
industry in Jezzine  0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
  1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 Delay in payment 
 
In contrast, the frequent failure of contract farming was also an important finding in the study. Disputes                 
related to price and methods of payment were primary reasons for not continuing with contracts. As                
observed in broiler production, these dissatisfactions along with the availability of other marketing             
alternatives have caused an attitude against contract farming. However, even the contracted farmers had              
a tendency for using other alternatives to decrease market risk. Processors prepare contracts which              
mean that they determine the conditions of the contracts. However, most of the interviewed farmers               
have agreed that all contract provisions could not be realized. When the spot market prices are higher                 
than the prices placed in contract, it was argued that farmers were selling the products in open market,                  
which have been produced under contract. Factors influencing farmers’ participation in contract            
farming, among all are: Distance to the main road, education, size of farm significantly influenced the                
probability of participation in broiler contract farming. Results also indicated that distance to the main               
road negatively influenced farmers’ participation. This implies that the further away the farm is from               
the main road, the less likely the farmer will participate in contract production. This finding is perhaps                 
due to the fact that the contracting firm prefers to work with farmers who are near the main roads due                    
to ease of reaching such farms. The level of education of the farmer, however, has a negative effect on                   
the farmer’s likelihood to participate in contract farming. Results show that an increase in years of                
education will reduce the likelihood to participate in contract farming, other things. This is probably               
due to the fact that more educated farmers are more likely to seek information on other marketing                 
channels in the region including hotels and rural assemblers. Education level has a positive significant               
effect on contract farming, which means the operator with higher education level is more likely to use                 
contract farming. Farm size has a positive significant effect on contract farming, which means if the                
size of the farm is larger; it is more likely to use contract farming. Hence, it can be assumed that the                     
contract provides more precise and experienced extension service or technical advice than the             
non-contracted farmers. It also highlights that government can play a crucial role in linking broiler               
producer to market, particularly in developing countries. 
 
Discussion 
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 The above discussion reveals that because of poor performances of institutions, broiler industry is              
facing major crisis such as, decelerating growth, increasing numbers of farmer suicides, and widening              
disparities in farm incomes. Suicide is confined to certain regions and certain group of farmers who                
produce for market. To overcome these problems successive central and various state governments             
have been undertaking an array of policy measures. Among those measures, promotion of private              
sector participation in contract farming is an important one. In response to this contract farming has                
emerged as a new institutional arrangement encompassing broiler industry to bring down the market              
uncertainties and complexity of the problem. On the other hand, spot market cannot fulfill the firm’s                
demand. By entering into contract, farmers can access the better quality of inputs and extension               
services along with credit from sponsors. Contract farming stimulates technology and skill transfer and              
supports to farmers in meeting of international standard. Contract farming boosts farm income by              
opening up opportunities and employing resources in an efficient manner. 
 
It is clear from that contract farming is not suited to all commodities or economic conditions. Studies                 
emphasize that the appropriateness of contract farming as a rural development strategy can change              
between a district and another, a governorate and another, a country and another. In Lebanon               
competitive markets, income diversification and booming imports opportunities have rendered contract           
farming sometimes ineffective and largely unnecessary. In some regions in Lebanon, the second             
generation of broiler producers have little interest in continuing to produce broiler in small or large                
scale, instead they prefer and can frequently obtain urban or city employment in manufacturing,              
services or other sectors. 
 
Conclusion 
Through this research and the analysis of the existing literature, several important insights have been               
made clear. Contract farming is largely successful in improving farmer economic welfare. From a              
developmental perspective, this bears important implications because policymakers can be reasonably           
assured that investment of resources into developing contract farming is a fruitful policy venture. This               
dissertation shows that there is increase in income in contract production; it revealed that contract               
farming leads to greater production compared to non-contract farming. This indicates that the provision              
of extension service or technical advice by an enterprise might improve the production since enterprise               
has more experience in broiler production than farmers. We found that education positively effect on               
contract participation. The result revealed that farmers producing under a contract had significantly             
higher incomes than non-contract households, and producers transfer most of their production risk to              
processors. Entering a contract farming arrangement means gaining access to credit, inputs, and             
technical assistance. Throughout this study, we find that public enterprises play a crucial role in               
promoting contract farming development in Lebanon, particularly in an economy ridden with market             
failures and imperfections. Further institutional improvements are necessary to facilitate efficient           
resource allocation for further development of the Lebanese broiler sector. Along with institutional             
improvements such as pricing, contract enforcement, and providing more information on contract            
farming to small-scale broiler growers. 
 
This study examined and evaluated the impact of contract farming on the economic sustainability of               
smallholders in broiler production in Jezzine District, Lebanon. Comparison was made between two             
groups of farmers namely independent farmers and contracted farmers. A sample of 11 farmers were               
selected and interviewed using questionnaires and the data is analyzed. Results of impact assessment              
show that participating in contract farming has a positive and significant effect on the economic               
welfare of broiler producers and can reduce rural poverty as some policies which will make it easier for                  
farmers to participate in contract farming should be pursued. Contract farming has been proposed as an                
avenue for private sector to take over the roles previously served by the government in the provision of                  
information, inputs or credit for farmers in developing countries. 
 
After literature review, the paper set up the overall hypothesis that assumes a positive relationship               
between contract farming and economic benefits and sustainability of small-scale farmers. This study             
applied deeply case study approach with one case investigated in Jezzine District - Lebanon. By               
analyzing and discussing the results following the methodology used it is concluded that the hypothesis               
is supported by several factors. 
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 The experience of broiler production is increasing, and it has contrasted with products imported from               
developed countries through global meat trade. Broiler producers face constraints that limit their             
potential to increase productivity and income. Access to credit is limited by the high interest rates                
demanded. There are also a number of disadvantages and threats, such as the limits to the inclusivity of                  
contract farming schemes, which is often restricted to the top tier of smallholder producers;              
nonetheless, it is possible that the farmers can lock into a situation of increasing debt because they                 
cannot move out from contract easily after entering into it. Usually, firm supplies inputs and sometimes                
machinery to growers in advance and takes it back payment through the deduction from crop income.                
This induces farmers to keep contracting with the firm year after year just to pay off these loans. The                   
development of these phenomena are often generate problems for farmers who have limited business              
experience. Contracting has certain harmful consequences, as well it creates tension between            
contracting parties; often unequal relations between larger integrators and farmers, farmers bearing            
high risks, and contract terms for farmers declining over time in the process of ‘agribusiness               
normalization’. The firms also tend to practice “agribusiness normalization” over time which means             
that they reduce the prices and other benefits offered to the growers with which they commence                
operations, when the procurement base is created and there are enough farmers to procure from. 
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